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Purpose of Study.--The general purpose of this study is to
present an account and analysis of United States policy toward the
United Arab Republic (formerly Egypt), 1945-1959.
The specific purposes of this study are: (1) to present an
account of the background and framework of American policy toward
the United Arab Republic from 1945-1956; (2) to offer a discussion
of the Suez Crisis, 1956-1957; and (3) to investigate American policy
toward the United Arab Republic from the end of the Suez Crisis
until 1959. In dealing with American policy toward the United Arab
Republic from 1945-1956, the significance of the Middle East to the
United States, the decline of British power in the area, the Truman
Doctrine, the creation of the state of Israel and Egyptian-Israeli
conflicts, the Baghdad Pact, and Arab nationalism and the Arab League
will be discussed. The discussion of the Suez Crisis will include its
forces and causes, the rise and role of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the role
of the West, and the Eisenhower Doctrine. The discussion of United
States policy toward the United Arab Republic from the end of the
Suez Crisis until 1959 will embrace the creation of the United Arab
Republic, competition in the area by the Soviet Union for a favored
position, and the role of the United Arab Republic in this competition,
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and trends of United States policy toward the United Arab Republic
during this period.
Methods of Research.--The methods to be employed are the
historical and analytical. In giving the background and other im
portant data the historical method will be used. The analytical
method will be employed to examine and relate events.
Scope and Limitations.--This study will cover the period,
1945-1959. The study ends with the year 1959 because since that
time there has been little change in the relations of the United
States toward the United Arab Republic.
Sources of Materials.—The materials used will be collected
from books, articles, periodicals, public documents and speeches.
Significance of Study.--The study is significant because the
Middle East, with the United Arab Republic at its helm, can serve as
a barricade against Soviet expansion into the African continent or it
can function as an avenue for such penetration. Also, the security
of Western Europe and the United States depends, in part, upon the
Middle East. Moreover, Gamal Abdel Nasser's attempt to unite the
Middle Eastern nations into another world "bargaining power" poses a
serious threat to the security of the United States. The Middle East
is playing a primary role in changing the trends in the struggle for
power between the Soviets and the United States.
■'"John Marlowe, Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism (New York,
1961), pp. 188- 90. See also New York Times. January 18, 1959, p. 4.
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND AND FRAMEWORK OF AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD
THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC: 1945-1956
Significance of the Middle East.--Until the First World War,
American interest in the Middle Eastern area was largely cultural.
American citizens there made little contribution toward the growth
of nationalism. However, now and then, American opinion spoke out
in favor of freedom and against those governments which ignored and
suppressed it. The Middle Eastern population saw America as a be
nevolent but distant friend. As a government and as a nation, how
ever, the United States took no stand and had no policy.
The beginning of the Second World War actually brought the
United States into the Middle East. Economists and American engineers
were sent to Iran to maintain the lend-lease supply line to Russia,
and to advise and assist the Iranian government. American arms and
goods flowed into Egypt to build up the strength of the Allied
Middle East Command. In all the wartime diplomacy concerning such
matters as Turkey's assurance of Iran's independence, the United
States found itself playing a new role partly because of its role as
a leading allied power intent upon winning the war and laying the
John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East: Problems of
American Policy (New York, I960), p. 29.
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foundations for a stable peace. President Roosevelt showed a lively-
interest in the Arab world when he visited King Ibn Saud in Egyptian
waters in February, 1945, on his return from Yalta. It was in 1945
that the United States became conscious of the truly vital importance
of Egypt for global defense. Cairo had served as headquarters of the
Middle East Command and Middle East supply center; the receiving end
of the vast airlift, the other end of which was America. It was
during this period that:
The United States became conscious, above all, of
the disastrous potentialities of the Middle Eastern
juxtaposition of power vacuum and the Soviet's dynamic
strength. We also became aware of the fact that the
link of the vacuum with poverty was bound to propel the
Soviet's sweep into the region.
After the Second World War the United States was
entrusted with the task of leading the free world's
fight against the Soviet's plans.2
The Middle East's significance as seen after 1945 lies in its
strategic, economic, and political importance. The strategic signifi
cance of the Middle East lies in the fact that the convenient routes
of land, air and water communication between the West and East are
found in this area. Moreover, the Middle Eastern area contains two-
thirds or more of the world's oil resources. The continuing uninter
rupted flow of this oil is necessary to the economic and military
strength of the United States' European allies, which in turn is
3
important to the security of the United States,
Emil Lengyel, Egypt's Role in World Affairs (Washington,
1957), p. 99.
%nited States Department of State, The United States and the
Middle East. Department of State Publication No. 7706 (Washington,
1964), p. 1.
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The economic and political significance of the Middle East can
be found in its vast storehouse of oil deposits. Because the Middle
Eastern Nations were underdeveloped, control and operation of the
oil deposits since 1900 has been in the hands of foreign competitors.
This has steadily injected new tensions into the Middle Eastern area
because much of the wealth of the area has gone to outsiders. The
Middle Eastern nations feel that if this wealth were kept inside the
region it could be used for the economic advantage of the persons in
the area.
The Middle East, further, can serve as a barrier against Soviet
expansion in the African continent^ or it can serve as an inroad for
such penetration. The security of Western Europe and the United States
depends upon the Middle East. The main objective of the Soviet Union
is to weaken the Western Alliance and keep the Middle Eastern area in
a state of unrest and tension so that it can achieve its goal—a
Mediterranean outlet and eventually North African Communist penetration.
The Soviet Union attempts to create a vacuum by forcing Western with
drawal from the area. This may be seen in the recognition of the
Soviets of the independence of Syria and Lebanon in 1945; their sup
port of the Security Council of the United Nations in 1946 for the
withdrawal of British and French troops from the former mandated ter
ritories; and their support of Egypt in her grievances against
4See the Atlanta Constitution. May 4, 1965, p. 4, for further
information on possible Soviet penetration into Africa.
5Alfred M. Lilienthal, There Goes the Middle East (New York,
1960), p. 18.
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Britain in 1947. The Soviets have also sought to promote tension and
unrest by supporting, along with the United States, the partitioning
of Palestine by the United Nations in 1947. Also, the Soviets have
kept, primarily since 1951, a steady stream of technicians, diplomats,
and civilian employees pouring into the Middle Eastern area. The
Soviets have had no territorial holdings in the Middle East; have no
record of "oil imperialism" and have avoided, for the most part, public
interference in the area. Hence the Russians are able to cry: "Out
with the colonialist and imperialists."
Decline of English Power in the Middle East.--Before the United
States took on the task of attempting to protect the Middle East from
the Soviets, it was Britain's task. Britain played a dominant part
in the Middle East because of the weaknesses of the Ottoman Empire
and the increasing strength of Russia. Britain's primary concern,
until the time of the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, was to pre
vent France from obtaining a predominant influence in Egypt; for such
influence would threaten Great Britain's Indian possessions. The
opening of the Suez marked the beginning of a more positive active
interest on Britain's behalf in reference to Egypt. Ottoman influence
had declined and French power had correspondingly increased. However,
France's weakness as a result of the Franco-Prussian War and Great
Britain's influence in Europe was sufficiently strong enough to stop
unilateral intervention by France, and it was Great Britain who occu
pied Egypt. Britain's real position was hence not only one of the
6Ibid.. pp. 19-26.
Great Powers but also of a global umpire and police force.
In two World Wars against the Germans, Britain lost much of
its world power and also felt the impact of age in a fast-changing
world. Furthermore, England was no longer the financial power center
of the world. Thus in 1947 England vacated her position in the
Middle East and offered it to the United States. In this year London
informed Washington that it was no longer able to protect the Eastern
Mediterranean area against the Soviets and thenceforth America would
o
have to assume the responsibility of halting the Communists in Greece.
In the spring of 1947, the foreign policy of the United States shifted
decisively. The containment of Communism was evident with the enun
ciation of the Truman Doctrine.
The Truman Doctrine.--President Truman and his principal advisers
saw the Soviet termination of the 1925 treaty with Turkey and its out
right demand for bases on the Straits and for a sizeable part of
Turkey's territory as a direct threat to American security. These
demands by the Soviet Union provided a clear test of the will and
ability of the West, particularly the United States, to call a halt to
future Soviet expansion, and also the importance which they attached
to the Middle East.9 The United States acknowledged a sphere of
influence in the Middle East where it had never had great interests.
President Truman asked Congress, in March, 1947, for $400 million in
7Lengyel, op. cit., p. 100.
^Stephen D. Kertesz (ed.), American Diplomacy in a New Era
(Notre Dame, 1961), p. 283.
9Campbell, op. cit., pp. 32-33.
economic aid to Greece and Turkey to combat Communism. The British
empire had ceased to be a world power and the United States was called
upon to resume Britain's work.
The Truman Doctrine, authorizing $300 million in military aid
to Greece and $100 million for Turkey, equally divided between eco
nomic and military assistance, protected the Middle Eastern area on
one side.
The Truman Doctrine, along with the later Eisenhower Doctrine,
coupled with the use of force, asserted the predominant interest of
the United States in direct succession to British diplomacy in the
nineteenth century, designed to preserve the integrity of the old
Ottoman Empire and to bar Russia from the Persian Gulf.
Creation of the State of Israel and Egyptian-Israeli Con
flicts.-- The situation in the Middle East worsened as conflicts
broke out between the Arabs and Israel. One of the most serious
Middle East dilemmas for the West as well as for the Arabs, after
World War II,was the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. With
the advent of Adolph Hitler the Jewish population in the Holy Land
increased rapidly from the fifty thousand inhabitants in 1917 to a
number that threatened the land's absorptive capacity. The result
of increased immigration into Palestine was a three-way conflict
between the Jewish nationalists, who demanded a state, the Arab
10William G. Carleton, The Revolution in American Foreign Policy
(New York, 1963), p. 73.
1:LPhilip W. Thayer (ed.), Tensions in the Middle East (Baltimore,
1958), p. 4.
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nationalists, who insisted upon self-determination and Britain.
This conflict led to illegal immigration, violence, and sabotage,
with Britain caught in the middle of the two conflicting nationalisms.
In 1947 Britain placed the controversy in the hands of the
United Nations. Four months later a majority of the United Nations
Special Committee on Palestine recommended partitioning Palestine
into separate Israeli and Arab states. After much debate, pressure
and coercion the Israeli group succeeded in setting up an independent
12
state in Palestine on May 15, 1948.
The Arabs saw the new society being created as a threat to
their tradition and culture. They were becoming increasingly resent
ful of colonialism and the "stirring of nationalism added to the emo
tional, psychological reaction to this Western, indeed foreign,
organism coming into existence at the heart of their world." The
Arab ill-feeling toward the newly-created Israel state resulted in
swift retaliation. A full-scale war erupted immediately. The Arab
war has been divided into two parts--the unofficial and the official.
Preparations were made by the Jews and Arabs for war as early as
November 30, 1947, with the first concentrated attacks by the Arabs
being made from January to April, 1948. The first phase of the offi
cial war began May 15 and ended June 11, 1948, followed by a truce
set forth by the United Nations in June, 1948. The war was the im
mediate result of a dispute over crossroads used to supply the
12Lilienthal, op. cit., pp. 1-14.
13Thayer, op. cit., pp. 216-17.
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Israeli settlements in the Negev. The original arrangements (provided
by a second United Nations truce mediated by Ralph J. Bunche) was to
allow the Egyptians to send convoys eastward (the Beit Jibrin-Bethle-
hem area) for six hours, and the Israelis to send convoys southward
for six hours. The arrangement failed to work, however. The Egyptian
convoys refused to allow the Israeli convoys to pass through their
14
territory to the south of the Faluja crossroads.
Although there were many Arab states and thus many soldiers,
the Israeli forces inflicted a humiliating defeat on them. The Jews
successfully defended their main coastal area and their outlying settle
ments, and gained control of a new portion of Jerusalem. The only
major victory by the Arabs was the capture of the old city of Jerusalem.
The conflicts continued and over two thousand minor raids and three
armed clashes took place between Israel and the Arabs before 1956.
The Arab-Israeli problem has been presented to the United Nations
several times, but no real solution has been reached and none seems
likely in the near future. For as a Syrian delegate told the United
Nations General Assembly in 1956:
We must begin from the beginning. We must start _de
novo on a clean sheet. Everything written by the United
Nations should be written off ever since the 29th Novem
ber, 1947. The establishment of Israel, its membership
in the United Nations and all other resolutions will have
to be revoked. Then, and then only, the United Nations
and David Kimche, A Clash of Destinies (New York, 1960),
pp. 73-265.
15Jules Davids, America and the World of our Time: U. S.
Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1960), pp. 506-511.
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can look forward to a solution on a mutually acceptable
basis.16
The Arab-Israeli War began as a rebellion on the part of the
Jews against British mandatory rule in Palestine. Hence, the outcome
of the war in Palestine was more a defeat of Britain than of the Arab
countries. The Arabs suffered some loss; however, it was Britain
which suffered most. In the short span of ten years Britain lost
all its positions of direct control in the Middle East and was on
the verge of losing its direct control over the rich oil deposits of
the area. Britain's Prime Minister, Attlee, failed to understand that
his empire could not abdicate at will. Britain did not exhibit a
conscious policy of abdication, but one of drift, mixed with delaying
decisions and improvising when delay was no longer possible. ' How
ever, Attlee was not alone in the lack of usage of a conscious policy
in the Palestine question. The United Nations also failed to commit
itself, both*as a secretariat and as an international organization, as
long as it were possible. President Truman more often avoided deci
sions than made them. The Egyptian leaders were anxious to avoid a
situation where they had to publicly take a stand, and the same was
true of the Arab League secretariat under Azzam Pasha. All of these
drifted from one position to another until they had drifted into war
and British abdication from Palestine.
16Ibid.. p. 511.
17See Harry S. Truman, Memoirs (Garden City, New York, 1956),
II, for a distinct picture of Mr. Attlee's techniques.
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The British view during the Arab-Israeli War was sketched so
that she could avoid jeopardizing her relationship with the Arab world,
even at the cost of annoying the Americans and outraging the Jews.
Hence British policy drifted into the Palestine War and drifted on
afterwards to other landmarks of the British decline in the Middle
East.
Palestine was the watershed for British imperialism, the old
and the new, for it marked the end of the old order in the Middle
East. The Palestine War sealed the establishment of Israel, and
also signalled the beginning of the real Arab awakening, the Middle
18
East revolution that was to come.
In order to resist the danger of war among the Arabs and Israel,
the United States, Britain and France entered into an agreement, the
Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950. This agreement guaranteed
the borders between Israel and the other Arab states against aggres
sion from either side and gave notice that the pact-makers would limit
shipments to the levels required for internal security (the Egyptians
19
bought arms from Czechoslovia and Russia however).
The purpose of the Declaration was to maintain stability within
the region and not to the matter with which the Western powers were
becoming principally concerned--the defense of the area against attack
by the Soviets.20 The Declaration also pledged those who signed it to
18Kimche, op. cit.. pp. 273-77.
19Kertesz, op. cit.. p. 291.
^Charles D. Cremeans, The Arabs and the World; Nasser's Arab
Nationalist Policy (New York, 1963), pp. 137-38.
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take action both within and outside the United Nations to prevent
frontier violations between Israel and the Arab states.
The Declaration, however, even though its content seemingly makes
a clear and concise stand, had a serious flaw. The pact was merely a
statement of intention and had no clause for the establishment of
institutions to enforce it.
In the autumn of 1950, President Truman sent a State document to
the King of Saudi Arabia. He expressed the interest of the United
States in the independence of the King's nation. This document was
set forth, probably, because of America's interest in the Dhahran air
field on the Hasa coast of this kingdom, "the largest and most conven
ient in that part of the world." The king, being an orthodox Muslim,
could sign no agreement with Truman, whom the king, an Islamic true
believer, is expected to be constantly at war.2^ The first move of
power by America came in 1951. In October, 1951, the three great
Western powers, Britain, the United States, and France, along with
Turkey, proposed a Middle Eastern resemblance of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization known originally as the Allied Middle East Command,
and later talked of a Middle Eastern Defense Organization (MEDO). The
establishment of MEDO was especially aimed at meeting the interests of
Great Britain. Great Britain desired to maintain her old position and
22
the bases held during and prior to World War II, especially Suez.
The Middle East Command never materialized. The Egyptian government
21Lengyel, op. cit., pp. 101-102.
22Kertesz, op. cit.. p. 288.
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was committed to forcing the British out of the country and would not
consider an international defense of its prized waterway, the Suez.
Russia presented a formal protest claiming that the plan would only
benefit the West. Speculators in the West doubted the wisdom of a
regional enterprise that contained only one Middle Eastern nation;
others feared that England was trying to win support for a hopeless,
if not exhausted, Suez policy. If nothing else constructive did not
materialize from this project, "it did foreshadow the more ambitious
23
schemes of the Eisenhower-Dulles era after 1953,"
The Baghdad Pact.--On January 12, 1955, the government of Iraq
announced its decision to conclude an alliance with Turkey, a country
which already had a treaty with Pakistan. The result was the
Baghdad Pact, encouraged by the United States through the Middle
Eastern Treaty Organization (METO). METO was sponsored by John Foster
Dulles and called for the creation of a collective defense regional
arrangement of the Northern Tier countries--Iraq, Iran, Turkey and
Pakistan--which would be linked by Britain,25 to fill the gap between
NATO and SEATO (The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization). This pact
was negotiated by and with American support but under British leader
ship,26 for Mr. Dulles wished to avoid charges made by Arab nationalists
2%ichard W. Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy (New
York, 1962), p. 701.
Cremeans, op. cit., p. 140.
25Davids, op. cit.. p. 514.
26W. W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena (New York,
1960), p. 324.
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that the United States was simply interested in establishing a puppet
organization to further Western aims in the Middle East.27 The Baghdad
Pact still left the United States far from a position of strength in
the Middle East. Militarily, the pact offered little prospect for
effective defense. Turkey with its troops already committed to NATO,
could only try to hold its own territory in the east. Iraq and Iran
were weak, and Pakistan was involved in sporatic conflicts with India.
The countries of Iraq, Iran and Pakistan had joined primarily to get
arms from the United States rather than out of faith in the concept
of regional security. Britain had joined in order to save her position
in Iraq and to strengthen its declining influence throughout the Middle
East. The refusal of the United States to join had left all of the
members with a feeling that they had been deceived and let down. Iraq
was left isolated in the Arab world and its government was gravely
weakened. The gap between the Northern and Southern Tier of Arab states
had been widened creating opportunities for Soviet penetration of the
28
Arab world, for
. ..Although the treaty enabled the United States and
Britain to maintain military bases in the Northern Tier
27Davids, op. cit.. p. 514.
28The signing of the Baghdad Pact, February 24, 1955, infuriated
Nasser who saw it as a blow to Egypt's primacy in the Arab world and
a betrayal of Anglo-American assurances that Cairo would be the center
of any regional system of collective defense. Then a raid into the
Gaza Strip by Israeli soldiers on February 28 revealed the inferiority
of Nasser's military forces and pushed him along a path which ran
counter to Washington's prescription for keeping peace in the Middle
East. Since the Triparte Declaration of 1950, the United States had
tried to prevent an arms race in the area. England and France were
often only lukewarm, but the real danger lay in the Soviet bloc.
Nasser, as discussed later, cleverly capitalized on Russia's anger
over the Baghdad Pact.
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countries adjacent to the Soviet Union, it sharpened at
the same time the rivalry between Egypt and Iraq in the
Arab world, and it created a great deal of alarm in
Russia. It soon became apparent that the Soviet Union
intended to do something to immobilize the Western
military bases in her own back yard.^9
Arab Nationalism and the Arab League.—Arab nationalism is marked
by an attempt of the Arab countries to resist direct and indirect domi
nation by the West. Thus Arab nationalism may be defined as a reaction
to pressures by the West, developed from "a growing consciousness of
a common interest of a common tradition." This common interest has
been defined as the construction of a powerful political and economic
unit to resist pressure from and to increase the bargaining power against
the two Great Power blocs. The common tradition is marked by a common
origin, a common language, and to a great extent a common religion and
the common memory of a specific civilization. Arab nationalism today
is essentially a domestic movement within the Arab world attempting to
convert and absorb the many forces operating within the Arab world.
It is identified with Gamal Abdel Nasser whose policy and propaganda
have developed forces of Arab unity in opposition to the various forces
30
operating against that unity. "
It is not clear as to when the seeds of nationalism first burst
into full bloom in the Arab world. John Marlowe, in his Arab Nationalism
and British Imperialism, cites the landing of Bonaparte in Egypt in
29
Davids, op. cit., p. 514.
3°John Marlowe, Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism (New
York, 1961), pp. 1-5.
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1798 as the beginning of Arab nationalism. For it was at this time
that:
. . .the lands of the Ottoman Empire became more and
more exposed to military, cultural, economic and political
influence on a culturally dormant, politically stagnant
and economically sterile society which set in train those
diverse spiritual, intellectual, social and political
ferments which go to make up Arab nationalism as we know
it today.31
However, Sylvia G. Haim states, in the introduction to her Arab
Nationalism; An Anthology, that Arab nationalism is a recent develop
ment as an ideology and as a factor in Middle Eastern politics. This
author sets the beginning of the elaboration of Arab nationalism as a
doctrine after the First World War. It was during this period, she
states, that:
. . .politicians in Iraq and Syria, enjoying a measure
of independent action and able to exploit the rivalries
of the Great Powers in the Middle East, began to attempt
the creation of a state which would embrace the whole of
the 'Arab Nation.'32
Arab nationalism owes much of its spirit to Jamal al-Din al
Asadabadi, Abullah al-Nadim, Muhammad Abduh, Muhammad Rashid Rida,
Abd Al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, and Neigib Hzoury.
Jamal al-Din al-Asadabadi (1838-1897), commonly known al-Afghani
whose activities and teachings contributed to the spread of revolu
tionary temper and a new attitude toward politics throughout the
Muslim East, was one of the first exponents of Arab nationalism.
31Ibid., p. 7.
32Sylvia G. Haim, Arab Nationalism: An Anthology (Berkeley,
1962), p. 3.
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Al-Afghani justified his political activity by the theory of "safety
and deliverance in killing" the oppressors. He believed that:
The Islamic peoples of the world were in a deplorable
situation; the states which ought to protect them and pro
cure for them a good life were weak, misgoverned, and the
prey of European ambitions. To remedy this state of affairs,
the Muslims had to take matters into their own hands; they
had to force, even terrorize, their rulers into governing
efficiently, and they had to band together in order to present
a powerful and united front to the encroaching European.
Al-Afghani, through his teachings and activities, placed Islam
(by following religion devoutly, he thought, a strong state would
result) on the same plane as other solidarity-producing beliefs. He
was instrumental in spreading a "secularist, melorist, and activist
attitude toward politics" among the intellectual and official classes
of Middle Eastern Islam.
Abdulla al-Nadim (1843-1896), a member of one of al-Afghani's
circle, also taught that the reason for the backwardness of the East
and for the success of Europe is that the Europeans have unified the
language of their subjects, gradually unified the races, and imposed
religious uniformity. He advised the Muslims to restore and preserve
solidarity, and attempt to support a national union so that the Muslims
may "let the whole be as one man, seeking only one thing--to preserve
Egypt for the Egyptians."
Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), known later as Mufti of Egypt,




and modernity, as well as the necessity for the Muslims to cast-off
outdated superstitions and to strive to acquire the blessings of
Western civilization. Although much of Muhammad Abduh's teachings
pertains only remotely to nationalism, the relevance of his teachings
is that he made popular an attitude toward politics, a belief that
human action, based on rational and scientific principles, could remedy
the human condition. He felt that the intellectual, by denouncing
superstition, and by making science and philosophy understood, holds
the key to the door of political and social progress.
It is with the Syrian Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935) that
Arab nationalism may be said to have begun. It was Rida, a disciple
of Mufti, who formed the Decentralization Party when the Young Turks
attempted to stiffen the policy that was detrimental to the Arabs and
the Ottoman Empire.
It was not until the 1930"s that a serious attempt was made to
define the meaning of Arab nationalism and the exact ingredients of
the Arab nations. These attempts became more frequent in the 1940's,
and in decades since then "hardly a month passes which does not see
the publication of one or more books on this subject."35
Sometime in the late 1930's, some Arab nationalists began
seriously to consider including Egypt in the nationalist movement. They
knew that Egypt was rich and populous, and if freed from British control
she would likely become a power in the Middle East. To officially
35Ibid., p. 35.
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encourage Egypt to join the other Arab nations the Arab Union was
formed in 1942 to work for Arab unity. In 1943 preliminary talks on
Arab unity were held in Cairo.36
The Arab League was formed in Cairo in March, 1945, by Egypt,
Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Transjordan. Its aim
was to create an Arab federation which would present to the outside
world something like a united front translated through common tradition
and common aspirations. The Arab countries found agreement on, first,
the independence of Palestine by means of speeding up the policy
laid down in the White Paper,37 and secondly, the immediate inde
pendence of Syria and Lebanon.38 Beyond these two points all
was rivalry and dissension; thus it was clear that to initiate any
fruitful scheme of cooperation it would have to be conceived in terms
of the sovereignty of each of the Arab States within their existing
boundaries. External unity was not achieved by the Arab nations be
cause of the question of the future of Palestine. The primary question
was that if Palestine emerged as an Arab State in accordance with the
provisions of the White Paper, would it become an independent state,
or would it unite with Transjordan and become a tentacle of Syria?
Failure to agree on this question paralyzed united Arab action over
Palestine and over all other questions for it displayed the double
36Ibid., p. 51.
37The MacDonald White Paper is a document set forth by Great
Britain in 1939 restricting immigration into Palestine.
38Marlowe, op. cit., p. 42.
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rivalry between the Nile and Euphrates on one side and the desert and
the fertile area on the other.
By the spring of 1959, the Arab League had been in existence
for fourteen years. At this time the members had increased from
seven to ten with the addition of Sudan, Lybia, Tunisia and Morocco,
and the subtraction of one due to Syria and Egypt fusing into the
United Arab Republic. Egyptian domination of the League may be seen
by the two Secretary-Generals, Abdul Rahman Azzam and Abdul Khaliq
Hassuna, both Egyptians, and the establishment of the League's head
quarters in Cairo. The League had proved during its existence quite
ineffective in the promotion of common action between its member
states in their relations with each other or with the outside world.
The League was not even an effective forum for the discussion of
differences between member states. After the Palestine calamity the
League was not used for promoting unity, but rather to conceal dis
unity behind a cloak of resolutions, without any action, proclaiming
Arab solidarity in the face of Zionism and imperialism. Perhaps the
only really effective aspect of the League was its increasing effective
ness as an organ of Egyptian foreign policy. This can be seen in the
pre-Nasser era when the League's influence was consistently directed
against Hashemite-inspired attempts to unify the Fertile Crescent.
Since Nasser's accession to power it has become more noticeable when
the Secretariat of the League almost wholly became a part of the propa




The policies and objectives of the United States have been
hindered greatly by Arab nationalism, for:
. . .Arab nationalism contains the strains of
resentment and suspicion engendered by the colonial
past and by the frustrations of the mid-Twentieth
Century. . . . Ideological and practical differences
between various Arab national groups have even been
the cause of ... violence, governmental upsets, and
continued instability.^0
At the present time, historical, ethnic, economic and social
differences have prevented development of a deeper unity among the
Arab lands.^ However, there is a growing school of thought sug
gesting that eventually a healing of the scars within the Arab camp,
and the problems underlying them, may make Arab unity possible some
day.
39Ibid., pp. 190-91.
U. Alexis Johnson, "American Policy in the Middle East," An
Address to the Citizens Committee on U. S. Policy in the Near East
(The Department of State, January 20, 1964), p. 3. (Mimeographed.)
41U. S. Department of State, op. cit., p. 8.
CHAPTER III
THE SUEZ CRISIS: 1956-1957
Forces and Causes.--The Soviet Union capitalized on the decline
in world cotton prices in 1955, which was brought about by the rumor
that the United States intended to dump much of its surplus cotton
in Western Europe at bargain prices. Egypt's exports were 85 per
cent cotton, and the mere expectation of lower cotton prices tempo
rarily dried up Egypt's European markets and caused her to go seriously
into "the red." The Soviet Union, then provided with an opportunity
to step into the Middle East, offered to buy some of Egypt's cotton
and got her satellites and Red China to purchase the remainder of the
cotton refused by the West. Egypt negotiated agreements with Russia,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and East Germany. Nasser welcomed
Russia not only as a profitable ally, but as a country from which he
could obtain arms shipments to enable him to renew his offensive
against Israel. The Soviet Union, in an effort to counteract the
Baghdad Pact, was happy to provide arms to Egypt. With Egypt obtaining
arms, Israel, too, appealed for increased arms from the United States.
The appeals were denied on the grounds that Israel seemed to be too
far ahead in the Arab-Israeli arms race; that France was furnishing
Israel arms; and that the United States did not want to contribute to
23
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an acceleration of the arms race.
2
Egypt, after receiving arms, speeded-up her fedayeen raids into
Israel. These specially trained hit-and-run troops knew the Israeli
country well and were instructed to invade the enemy territory and
shoot and murder anyone to paralyze the Jews with insecurity and fear.
Nasser, now with guns and ammunition, supplied some of the Soviet arms
to Algerian rebels (Nationalists) to aid them in their battle with the
French. Egypt now became a clearing house for arms traffic between the
Communist countries and the Arab and African states, and French leaders
concluded that Nasser must be eliminated. Only in this way, the French
believed, could the Algerian problem be solved.
During the period, 1955-1956, the situation grew increasingly
critical. America and Britain, hoping to concentrate Nasser's atten
tion on Egypt's economic problems, tried to divert him from his expan
sionist ambitions by offering to help him construct a high dam at Aswan,
800 miles south of Cairo.^ Nasser had dreamed of the construction of
a dam on the Nile at Aswan (originally suggested by Western engineers),
which would increase Egypt's irrigated territory by over 30 per cent
•'■William G. Carleton, The Revolution in American Foreign Policy
(New York, 1963), pp. 321-22.
fedayeens were commandos recruited from the Arab-Palestine
refugees.
^Richard W. Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy (New
York, 1962), p. 784.
^Jules Davids, America and the World of our Time: U. S. Diplomacy
in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1960), p. 515.
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and stimulate a vast expansion of electricity and industry. Nasser
saw this as a crowning star to add glory to his rule by enlarging the
production of food and goods in a traditionally famine-stricken and
poverty-ridden country. However, Nasser also realized that this star
would remain unlighted unless he could secure foreign financing for
the construction of the Aswan Dam. To prevent Russia from scoring
another triumph the Eisenhower administration joined Britain's Eden
cabinet in a trial offer of aid. Egypt felt it had the assurance of
Western aid. There were rumors that the Soviet Union would extend
loans to aid in building the dam. American sources (Secretary of
State Dulles) warned Egypt against taking a loan from the Soviet Union
and that to do so would jeopardize American aid. The Soviet offer,
however, proved only to be a rumor and did not materialize at the
time. In the meantime, Nasser played the Soviet Union against the
West, rejecting the British-American offer as "threatening Egypt's
independence," hinting he could do better in Moscow. Nasser's game
proved futile, for as mentioned, Russia's offer did not materialize
and eventually the West was also to withdraw its offer. Why? Because
offer involved an initial grant of $70 million, of which
the United States was to contribute 80 per cent (actually the United
States 56 per cent, Britain 14 per cent), to defray expenses for five
years and a promise of $130 million at 5 per cent, repayable in forty
years. Egypt was to be responsible for $900 million and was to obtain
agreement with Sudan, Uganda and Ethiopia, who also owned property
along the Nile, on the project.
Although the offer did not materialize at this time, Russia
ultimately financed nearly 30 per cent of the estimated $1 billion
cost of completion of the Aswan. "The Red Bankroll," Time. January
15, 1965, p. 30.
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of the vastness of the undertaking America and Britain expected that
Nasser would exercise some economic restraint to meet Egypt's share of
the costs, initially $900 million, and that he would be more reserved
in his arms purchases from the Soviet Union. This did not prove to
be true. Although Nasser wanted the Aswan Dam for Egypt, the lengthy
twenty year target date (1975) for completion dampened its popularity
in the country. Nasser was thus more interested, it appears, in
accumulating arms from Russia to deal with Israel.
Both the United States and Britain delayed handing over their
share of the money for the project because of the increasing close
harmony between Egypt and Russia. In May, 1956, Nasser recognized
Red China and accepted an invitation to visit her." When the money
did not arrive, Nasser indicated that there was a possibility that the
Soviets might finance the Aswan Dam, and indicated that this offer
might be accepted. Shortly after the British evacuated the Suez Canal
Zone in June, 1956, the Egyptian Ambassador in Washington was
date of completion is now expected in 1967, with installation
of the twelve enormous generators set for 1970. Atlanta Constitution,
January 1, 1965, p. 1.
8New York Times. May 18, 1956, p. 7.
9New York Times. May 25, 1956, p. 6.
British evacuation of the Suez Canal Zone was a result of the
Suez Base Agreement of 1954, prompted by the Egyptian's willingness to
compromise. This led Western officials to believe that the new regime
(1952) could do business with the West. Britain's decision to leave the
Canal Zone was probably influenced by evidence that even the strongest
military base had questionable value if surrounded by a bitterly hostile
population. Nasser's position was that once the special position of the
British in the Sudan and Canal Zone was removed, the new regime could
settle down to dealing with basic problems of economic and social reform.
England shifted its main base from the Suez Canal Zone to Cyprus.
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instructed to find out what were America's intentions in respect to
financing the Aswan Dam. There were signs that the offer may be with
drawn because of Egypt's anti-Western policies. Nasser supported the
Algerian rebels against France, and plotted against the British faction
in Iraq and Jordan; while the controlled Cairo press and radio slandered
the West, praised the Soviets, and proclaimed the doom of Zionism.
These suspicions proved to be correct. By then Nasser had almost
mortgaged his economy (for arms he employed dealing in the future for
cotton with the Soviet Union) to the Soviet bloc and hence raised serious
doubts of his ability to meet his share of construction costs. His
showy hostility to British-American policies had made such pro-Western
countries as Turkey and Iran ask why they had not received the same
massive help. Also, Congressional opinion had turned against the wis
dom of pro-Westernizing Egypt (primarily because of opposition in Con
gress from senators representing cotton-producing states), and on July
16 a Senate committee recommended that no appropriations under the
Mutual Security Act be used for the proposed dam. The Egyptian govern
ment was informed by the United States in July, 1956, that, because of
a number of practical considerations, it was not feasible in present
12
circumstances to participate in the Aswan project. With America's
refusal to help finance the project Britain promptly withdrew her offer
nLeopold, op. cit.. pp. 785-86.
12Ralph McGill, Nobel Prize winner and Publisher of the Atlanta
Constitution notes in his column of January 1, 1965, that this decision
was "made abruptly by the late Secretary of State Dulles, who acted
without conference with other agencies including the World Bank."
28
and on July 23 the World Bank's offer was withdrawn. It was explained
the Egyptian economy was already obligated too heavily to pay for the
dam.
Nasser was silent for four days. He had been attending a meeting
in Brioni.Yugoslavia,with Tito and Nehru of India, when the State Depart
ment's decision was announced. Nasser interpreted the Western refusal
to finance the dam not only as an effort to humiliate him, but as a
deliberate attempt to undermine world confidence in the Egyptian eco
nomy. His own prestige became tarnished. The center of his attack,
at first, was the United States. Washington, he declared, had acted
"without shame and with disregard for the principles of international
relations." Appealing to nationalist sentiment Nasser boldly declared,
"Egyptians will not permit any imperialists or oppressors to rule us
militarily, politically, or economically; we will not submit to the
dollar or to force. We are determined to live proudly and not to beg
for aid."14
At Alexandria on July 26, Nasser announced the nationalization
of the Suez Canal Company, which was largely owned by the British and
French. Nasser promised that the private company which owned and
13New York Times. July 20, 1956, p. 8.
14Davids, op. cit., p. 516. Nasser again indignantly stated at
his "Victory Day" speech celebrating the end of the 1956 Suez crisis,
inferring a United States threat to cut off $140 million a year in aid
to Egypt, "We drink tea seven days a week now; we can cut it to five.
We eat meat four days; we can cut it to three. We are people of dignity,
and do not accept disdain from anyone. . . .We shall not sell our inde
pendence for 30, 40, or even 50 million pounds." "Sea and Tymphany,'
Time, January 1, 1965, p. 35.
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operated the Canal would be reimbursed. The next day, a little over
a month after the British had withdrawn, Egypt seized the offices of
the company and declared martial law in the Canal Zone. The Aswan,
Nasser held, would be built from the money obtained from the operations
of the Canal. He warned the West against interference—"For the Egyptian
people were mobilizing and standing ready to defend their rights and
sovereignty against imperialism."
Gamal Abdel Nasser.--Gamal Abdel Nasser, head of the United
Arab Republic, is the symbol of Arab nationalism today. He has given
the force of Arab unity coherence and direction.^ Nasser took
the office of Prime Minister of Egypt from General Neguib, the Head of
State after a Republic had been formed in July, 1953. General Neguib,
after the Egyptian Revolution whereby Egypt was brought from under
British rule, was in favor of a gradual return to constitutional life.°
However, Nasser, at this time a relatively unknown figure, realized
that a return to constitutional life would involve a return to situa
tions of years before. The struggle between Nasser and Neguib ended
in April, 1954, when Nasser became Prime Minister and Chairman of the
Revolutionary Command Council and hence the real power in the country.
As mentioned, Nasser was relatively unknown, but through the use of
mass communication he built up quite a specific, clear-cut and well-
defined image of himself. Neguib, after being eliminated from public
Marlowe, Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism (New
York, 1961), p. 5.
The "final liberation from imperialism" was brought about by
an agreement reached in July, 1954, whereby the British agreed to
evacuate her troops from the Canal Zone within eighteen months.
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life, became a father figure in Egypt and did much to commend the new
regime to the people. '
The first task of the new President was to tame the Moslem
Brotherhood which, together with the Communists, turned against the
regime, after having originally greeted it with approval. Fearing
an attempted assassination by the Brotherhood, Nasser arrested some
four thousand members, tried, convicted and sentenced several to long
terms of imprisonment, and condemned six to death by hanging. Mean
while, Neguib, alleged to be the Brotherhood nominee as Head of State
after Nasser's overthrow, was placed under house arrest and later
18
vanished into obscurity. °
Nasser's nationalist obsession was evident in the Suez crisis.
He had held that failure at nationalism was due to a lack of unity and
to a lack of leadership. Thus Arab countries were being exploited be
cause of their geographical and economic advantages and in spite of
their potential bargaining position given to them by the Cold War.
Nasser's idea of re-establishing Egypt's primacy in the Arab
world was through the medium of what he described as a policy of "posi
tive neutrality". He was encouraged by the example of Nehru of India,
who was pursuing a similar policy among the countries of Southeast
Asia, and by the attitude of the Soviet Union, whose influence in the
Middle East was largely due to the fact that her foremost interests
(the denial of the West of military establishment in the Middle Eastern
area), paralleled Arab nationalist sentiments. From the Arab point of
'Marlowe, op. cit.. pp. 73-74.
18Ibid.. p. 76.
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view, the only advantage to be derived from a military pact was eco
nomic aid. Western policy, the offering of economic aid made conditional
on a military or political alignment with the West, tended to divide
the Arab nations. This policy resulted in committing the West to
support Arab governments, not against Russia, but against her Arab
neighbors. A policy of this sort may have been good if the West had
been able to persuade a majority of the Arab nations to join her camp.
However, the failure to win Egypt over to a policy of military alliance
and political collaboration, which was the key and would have made the
policy plausible, aided the Arab policy of neutrality.
At the end of 1954, Nasser was committed to neutralism, but had
not seriously embarked upon domination by Egypt of the Arab world.
In 1955, Nasser's policy was one of good will toward England and Iraq,
and of moderation toward Israel. However, by the end of 1955, the
Arab world was divided into two camps, one led from Baghdad which relied
on Western arms and support, and the other led from Cairo relying on
Soviet arms and support. The struggle was for control of the Fertile
Crescent and the Arabian Peninsula, taking the form of propaganda and
attempted subversion. The receipt of arms from Czechoslovakia in
September, 1955, (an attempt by Nasser to free himself from the system
of arms rationing whereby the Western powers attempted to tone-down the
Arab-Israeli Wars) marks the beginning of Nasser's imperialism in the
Middle East. It was, further, a gesture of defiance towards the West,
a threat to Israel and a statement of intention to the other Arab
nations. The arms agreement raised Nasser's prestige among the Arab
nations primarily because of his previous military incompetence which
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was due to the limitation of arms imposed on him by the West.
The conclusion of the arms deal had an adverse effect upon
American opinion. Until this time American policy regarded Egypt in
her relations with Great Britain as a country rightly struggling to
be free. The United States had aided through diplomatic pressure to
speed Britain's withdrawal from the Canal Zone and declined to join
the Baghdad Pact although the United States had originated the idea.
However, the arms deal caused the United States to view Egypt as a
potential Soviet satellite. Hence by the autumn of 1955, Egypt be
came committed to a policy, primarily concerning Arab nationalism
identified with neutralism and anti-imperialism, aimed at Egyptian
dominance over the Arab world, involving a struggle for power in the
Middle East against Great Britain and Britain's allies.19
The Role of the West.--The United States, England and France
protested against Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal. However, they
did not attempt to test the legality of their charge that the seizure
of "an international agency" for national purposes would be detri
mental to the freedom and security of the Canal, before the Inter
national Court of Justice, nor did they insist that the company be
restored to its former position (the Universal Suez Maritime Company's
concessions to operate the Canal would expire in 12 years, 1968).
England and France found it difficult to accept Nasser's assurance that
they would be reimbursed. They did not trust a man who had already shown
little respect for his international obligations. They thought that
19Ibid.. pp. 85-91.
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Nasser might bar their shipping from the Canal as he had done Israel
since 1950, in spirt of protests from the Security Council of the
United Nations.20 They doubted whether the Egyptian government could
retain or retrain the skilled personnel to carry on efficient operations
and whether it would devote the financial proceeds to carry out planned
improvements.
Moreover, in Nasser's move they saw a historic parallel. They
recalled Hitler's unopposed reoccupation of the Rhineland and were
determined to stop Nasser before it was too late. In London unrestricted
use of the Canal was seen as the destruction of the few remaining symbols
of British prestige in the Middle East. Meanwhile, in Paris the seizure
was seen as another blow to a pride wounded in Indochina and Algeria
where Egypt had supplied arms. The French and English became convinced
that they must be ready, in the last resort, to use force. This Prime
Minister Eden cabled President Eisenhower July 27, 1956.
The United States did not possess the same sense of urgency of
its Western allies, for the United States was less dependent upon the
Canal. The United States hoped for negotiation rather than the use of
force. The administration's thinking was influenced by a concern of
its image in the ensuing Presidential election and its desire not to
be associated with English-French colonialism. However, the President
sincerely believed that more could be gained by talking rather than by
fighting, hence he sent Secretary of State Dulles to London, where a
common policy was formulated on August 2, 1956.
20In 1955 the Canal handled 107 million tons of cargo, three-fifths
of which was oil destined to the countries of Europe.
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Dulles agreed with Eden that it was intolerable for any one
nation to have control of the Canal by influencing world opinion.
Dulles, however, felt force should be used only if all else failed.
Dulles began with a conference of the signors of the Constantinople
Conventional and of those countries whose tonnage and trade gave them
22
a vital interest in the Canal. Britain and France had assumed that
the United States had consented to direct responsibility in the Middle
East for a policy which required building a northern tier pact and
diluting Egypt's nationalistic desires. The United States was expected
by England and France to block Nasser forcefully and protect their vital
oil supply.
In a period of less than three months, August 16 to October 13,
1956, three attempts collapsed to settle the Suez question by diplomacy.
The first was a twenty-two nation conference at London, which recom
mended that the Canal be entrusted to an international board. The
second attempt was a scheme by Dulles to organize a Suez Canal Users
Association. The Association would make the paying of Canal tolls to
the Association permissive rather than mandatory, maintaining the route,
and hiring pilots. This scheme ruled out any American use or show of
force, although it would have given the United States a legal part in
the Canal, and struck British and French governments hard. The
Convention of October 29, 1888, guarantees free navigation
to all nations in peace or war. The basic instrument was signed by
England, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, and the Ottoman
Empire. The United States was not a party to this document.
22Leopold, op. cit.. pp. 786-87.
23W. W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena (New York,
1960), p. 357.
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Association appeared a promising and orderly place to stand if reso
lutely backed.
However, the British and French came to feel that the United
States had failed to protect their vital interest and had not honored
its pledged word. Nasser objected to the Association as he had the
recommendations of the London Conference. Although fifteen governments
consented to the Association by October 1, the project never went into
effect. The third attempt was a set of six principles worked out by
Britain, France and the Egyptian foreign ministers under the mediation
of Daj Hammarskjold, Secretary-General of the United Nations. These
principles called for the Canal to be open to all without discrimination,
insulation of its operations from the internal affairs of any country,
respect for Egyptian sovereignty, joint fixing of tolls by Egypt and
the users of the Suez Canal, allocation of revenues for improvements,
and arbitration of all disputes between the Canal Company and the
Egyptian government. These resolutions represented some concessions
by Nasser, but the absence of sanctions to compel him to fulfill his
obligations left them short of Anthony Eden's demand that no single
nation have unrestricted control of the Canal. In an attempt to insure
Nasser's compliance, England and France brought a two-part resolution
to a vote in the Security Council on October 13. The first half, con
cerning the six principles, passed unanimously. The second half, out
lining the guarantees, received the support of nine nations but was
24Ibid.. pp. 357-58.
36
killed by Russia's seventy-eighth veto. ^
As these attempts ended in futility, the Atlantic allies drifted
seriously apart. A basic difference separated the English-French and
American positions. To the English and French a principle involving
their very existence was at stake. To America only the unrestricted
use of the Canal seemed important. However, Britain was prepared to
fight rather than be left at the mercy of Nasser:
. . .the governments in London and Paris apparently
connived with the Israelis and the Israeli army attacked
Egypt. The Anglo-French allies—without consulting the
United States—sent an ultimatum to Egypt and failing of
a satisfactory answer attacked and occupied Port Said,
meanwhile bombing Al Maza airport at Cairo and other
Egyptian installations.26
The United States was persuaded that extreme measures were un
necessary. Washington held that, given the tactical nature of the
problem of seizing and holding a long canal, the use of force would
be ineffective; and, further, that it would only worsen an already
dangerous situation in the Arab world. The English and French had
agreed on August 2, 1956, to try other means, partly to obtain American
cooperation but mainly because they needed six weeks to mount an at
tack. By October 13, France and Britain became convinced that they
had been betrayed by the Secretary of State and the President. By
their plans, the Anglo-French coalition antagonized the United States
and lost any chance of winning its support for such a maneuver.
^Leopold, op. cit.. pp. 787-88. For a first-hand discussion of
Britain's intentions see Robert Murphy's, Diplomat Among Warriors (New
York, 1965), pp. 422-38.
^Stephen D. Kertesz (ed.), American Diplomacy in a New Era
(Notre Dame, 1961), p. 292.
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The appeal to arms in Suez was not an isolated incident. It
occurred at the same time when satellite uprisings broke out in
Eastern Europe on October 21-23, 1956, and the preventive war which
Israel started against Egypt on October 29. The amount of collabora
tion that existed between London, Tel Aviv and Paris is still disputed,
but there is no doubt that France materially strengthened Israel's
military establishment in previous months. It is evident that Ben-
Gurion ordered the invasion of the Sinai Peninsula, in spite of as
surances to the United Nations, to stop terroristic raids originating
there, to open the Canal to Israeli shipping, and to insure free
passage of the Gulf of Aqaba. It is also clear that the English-French
aerial bombardment of Cairo and the Canal Zone, which began on October
31, offset in Afro-Asian eyes Russia's ruthless repression of the
Hungarian rebellion and quickly converted Nasser from a "menace to
peace", into a "victim of aggression". When Eden and Mollet justified
dramatic measures as a device to keep the Sinai War away from the Canal
and when their troops required a week to secure key points, during
which time Egypt blocked the waterway by sinking ships, it became evi
dent that a great blunder had been committed.27
During this period Americans were about to go to the polls to
elect a president. Eisenhower, in his campaign, stressed peace and
prosperity. His policy in the Middle East had been to exclude Russia
from the area, keep the Canal controversy separate from the Arab-Israeli
feud, and uphold the Triparte Declaration of May 25, 1950, which
27Leopold, o£i_cit., p. 789.
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obligated the United States, Britain and France to take prompt action,
within or outside the United Nations, to check any breach of the
armistice lines.
On April 9, 1956, Eisenhower went further in promising "to sup
port and assist" any country in the region that was attacked. Now
the British-French move defeated every item in that policy. Dulles
had repeatedly warned Eden that seizure of the Canal would not destroy
Nasser but would, rather, lead to guerrilla war from which the Soviets
alone could benefit. Hence, there was little hesitation in taking a
stand against the NATO partners. "There can be no law if we work to
invoke one code of international conduct for those we oppose and another
for our friends." Thus he placed the ideals of collective security above
the realities of collective defense, even if he jeopardized the alliance
designed to provide the safeguards which the United Nations, in practice,
had not furnished.
On October 30, 1956, Henry Cabot Lodge offered a resolution in
the Security Council calling upon all members to refrain from using
force in Egypt and upon the Israeli troops to withdraw. Russia gave
its support, but England and France objected because they had already
sent a twelve-hour ultimatum to Cairo and Tel Aviv in which they de
manded an end to the fighting, the evacuation of all military units
to a distance of ten miles from the Canal, and Egypt's permission to
occupy temporarily positions along the route so as to separate the
belligerents and insure freedom of transit. With Australia and Belgium
refraining from voting, Lodge's motion received seven votes, but it was
lost when the British cast their first veto and the French their
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third. Russia also drafted a similar resolution, omitting the in
junction against interference by others, but it too failed to pass.
The next day the Council convened an emergency session of the General
Assembly under a procedure designed in 1950 to get around the Soviet
veto. On November 2, that body adopted by a vote of 64 to 5 with 6
refusing to vote an American resolution urging all parties to observe
a cease-fire and to withdraw behind the armistice lines of 1949.
The next days were ones of trial. On November 3, 1956, Dulles
underwent surgery for cancer.28 On the same day England and France
refused to accept a cease-fire until certain conditions were met;
Egypt continued to sink ships in the Canal; and saboteurs in Syria cut
off Britain's oil supply from Iraq. A second emergency session met
on November 4 to deal with Hungary, while the first renewed its appeal
to the nations concerned in the Sinai Peninsula. On November 5, the
Assembly created a multi-national Emergency Force "to secure and super
vise the cessation of hostilities"; and while several weeks elapsed
before the forces could take the field, the invaders were able to
retire without complete loss of face. However, at this time, this
gain was offset by Bulganin's warning that his country stood ready to
"crush aggression". At the same time the Kremlin sent a message to
President Eisenhower with the proposal that the two nations use their
air and naval forces to stop the war. Quickly the White House answered
that it was opposed to any Soviet action in the Middle East. Undeterred
by the refusal the Soviet government submitted a proposal to the
28When Dulles died in 1959, Nasser gleefully observed: "The
worms are now feeding on this rotten old man." "Sea and Tympany,
op. cit., p. 34.
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Security Council to authorize a joint United States-Soviet "police"
action in Egypt. This proposal was defeated, however.29 On election
day, November 6, Eisenhower ordered a global alert of the armed forces;
however by evening the worst was over. Having seized all of the Gaza
Strip, most of the Sinai Peninsula, and two islands in the Gulf of
Aquba, the Israeli forces agreed to halt their assault. Although, as
speculation goes, the Canal Zone could have been taken away from Nasser
in three more days, "Her majesty's government agreed to stop further
30
military operations."
Nasser emerged from this encounter stronger than before, because
Russia persuaded the Arab world that it had compelled "the colonialist
aggressors" to stop, because the problem of Israel and the control of
the Canal remained unsolved, and because the Western allies suffered
31
serious and permanent scars.
The Eisenhower Doctrine.--The 1956 crisis called for a review of
American policy. Washington had to consider certain facts: 1) England
had lost its role as a great power in the Middle East; 2) Russia had
intervened in the crisis, not with armed force but still strongly enough
to show that it would take full advantage of the division among the
Western allies. Hence the United States had to look to the grave danger
of the expansion of Soviet power. The method to thwart Soviet expan
sion was one of a new public posture rather than of new arms and policies.
29John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American
Policy (New York, 1960), p. 121.
30Emil Lengyel, Egypt's Role in World Affairs (Washington, 1957),
p. 81.
31Leopold, op. cit., pp. 790-91.
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America's objective for some years had been an attempt to prevent the
advance of Soviet power into the Middle East, evident in the Truman
Doctrine of 1947, and in the programs of military and economic assist
ance carried on since that time. What seemed needed now was a declara
tion showing that the "security frontiers" of the United States extended
to the Middle East as they did in Europe and Asia, while dramatizing
the aid programs and making them a more flexible instrument of policy
for the future.32 These aims are found in Eisenhower's message to
Congress on January 5, 1957, labeled a doctrine by the press.
The President requested a grant of authority in advance to halt
Communist aggression, direct and indirect, in the Middle East. The
proposal specifically called for: 1) authorization of the President
to employ as he deemed necessary the armed forces of the United States
to secure and protect the integrity and independence of any nation or
nations in the Middle Eastern area requesting aid against overt armed
aggression from any nation controlled by international Communism; 2) au
thorize the President to undertake programs of military aid to any
such nation or nations desiring it; 3) authorize cooperation with them
in the development of economic strength for the maintenance of their
national independence. The President also asked for authority to
spend $200 million of already appropriated funds (mutual security) for
military and economic aid in the Middle East. After a two-month debate,
the President won most of what he sought in a joint resolution passed
by the Senate on March 5 by a vote of 72 to 19, and the House, two
days later, 350 to 60.
32Campbell, op. cit.. pp. 121-22.
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In this resolution it is clear that America was announcing its
intention to fill the vacuum resulting from the decline in British
power. America knew that if it did not fill this vacuum the Soviets
would. The United States felt it necessary to make its power felt
there, through commitments and the will and ability to give them mean
ing.
Britain took satisfaction in the fact that America, after
"scolding" Britain for unilateral intervention, found it necessary to
proclaim a doctrine of what looked like one of unilateral intervention.
However, the United States took care to point out that it would assist
a nation only if it asked for help, and that going in to protect a
state against Communist aggression was very different from going in
with bombs to impose one's will.
The Eisenhower Doctrine did not yield a prompt resolution of the
Middle East crisis or even a change in the trend of events. It failed
partly because it was addressed too fully to remote or nonexistent
problem of a Soviet military invasion, and partly because the American
approach to economic development in the Near East and the whole posture
toward Arab nationalism incorporated in the Doctrine was not attractive
enough—or politically powerful enough in its affect on Arab and world
opinion--seriously to deflect Nasser from his goal of virtually unilat-
33
eral power in the Arab world.
33Rostow, op. cit., p. 361.
CHAPTER IV
UNITED STATES-UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC
RELATIONS: 1957-1959
Creation of the United Arab Republic.—Egypt and Syria merged to
form the United Arab Republic on February 1, 1958. This merger had
no marked affect upon the relations between Egypt and the United States.
In fact, Washington welcomed the merger as a move to frustrate a
Communist coup of Syria. In late 1957, some of the non-Communist
Syrians, including its President, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister,
and Baath Party leader, had to abandon plans to crack down on the
Communists in Syria, fearing that they were too weak to make the attempt
alone. The only solution was a merger with Egypt. Nasser did not take
well to the idea of the merger, but Salah Bitar, who had led a Syrian
delegation to Cairo in 1958, said Nasser had two alternatives—Nasser
could either help solve Syria's problems through union, or watch Syria
move into the Soviet camp, with Egypt possibly following. Nasser
agreed to the merger hailing it as the first step toward the union of
2
all the Arab nations.
The dual-country United Arab Republic was short-lived; Syria
withdrew in 1961.




Nasser became President and al-Kuwatli (former President of Syria)
became Vice President of the United Arab Republic, which was divided
into two regions, Egypt and Syria. Nasser appointed a cabinet composed
of 20 Egyptians and 14 Syrians, with the Egyptians holding the important
posts of defense, foreign affairs, education, and national guidance.3
The United States and the United Arab Republic felt that their
relationship could be improved through concrete acts of cooperation.
President Nasser stressed the common problem facing the United States
and the United Arab Republic in the Middle East, the prevention of a
Soviet victory. Nasser felt that the United States could not fight both
the influence of Nasser and the influence of the Soviets, for to do so
would only fuse Communism and Arab nationalism.
Although the United States and the United Arab Republic looked
upon their relations as improving, all suspicions had not yet vanished.
Abdel Hamid Serraj, United Arab Republic Minister of Interior for Syria,
accused King Saud of Saudi Arabia of planning to assassinate President
Nasser and to stymie the union of Egypt and Syria. Serraj claimed that
the United States was a party to the plot. When, on March 24, King
Saud was replaced by his brother, Crown Prince Feisal, the plot story
died without seriously affecting the favorable moves by the United
States and the United Arab Republic. By the spring of 1958 Washington
had learned that she must either deal with Nasser on his own terms or
not at all, and that cooperation with the United Arab Republic might
aid the United States' interest in other nations of the Arab world.
3Sydney N. Fisher, The Middle East: A History (New York, 1959),
pp. 636-37.
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Nasser, on the other hand, had returned to the belief that the United
States might be willing to help him without encroaching upon his
independence.
Competition: The Soviet Union.--The Soviet aims and demands in
the Middle East have been for straits, islands, ports, oil wells, and
a strategic location for defense purposes. Throughout Russia's history
one of its driving desires has been the urge to move Soviet territory
toward the sea. Karl Marx, speaking against Russian czarism, asserted
in 1853 in the New York Herald Tribune that:
. . .Istanbul in Turkey is the golden bridge between East
and West. The Western civilization like the sun is unable to
encompass the world without crossing this bridge. However,
Western civilization will be unable to cross this bridge with
out struggling with Russia. But let Russia get possession of
Turkey and her strength is increased nearly half and she be
comes superior to all the rest of Europe put together. Such
an event would be an unspeakable calamity to the revolutionary
cause.
In 1924 Trotsky stressed the importance of the Middle East when
he stated:
. . .We must cry aloud that we need Constantinople and
the Straits. A country such as ours cannot suffocate for
the caprice of the interests of anyone.°
Another Soviet motive in the Middle East has been to weaken the
position of the West, by any means short of war,7 rather than strengthen
4Ellis, op. cit., pp. 53-54.
5Ernest Gackh, "Mid-Land, Mid-Sea, Mid-Air," Mid-East: World
Center, ed. Ruth N. Ashen (New York, 1956), pp. 99-100.
6Ibid., p. 100.
^Irving Sedar and Harold Greenburg, Behind the Egyptian Sphinx
(Philadelphia, 1960), p. 29.
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her own position. In the United Arab Republic this technique burst
into full bloom in September, 1955, when Soviet arms were exchanged
for Egyptian cotton. This relationship later became more full when
the Aswan Dam was financed by the Soviet Union. Before 1954 trade
between the Middle Eastern nations and the Communist bloc had been of
little importance to both sides. For example, in 1938, only 5 per cent
of the Middle Eastern imports, and 3 per cent of its exports were with
the Soviet Union, although Middle Eastern trade was higher with the
countries of Eastern Europe.9
In 1954, however, Syrian and Egyptian trade began to rise with
the Soviet bloc. In 1959 the Soviet Union was Egypt's best customer,
with Communist China, East Germany and Czechoslovakia closely follow
ing. During 1954-1958, Soviet purchases of Syrian goods increased
almost four times the 1938 figure. However, Syria bought more from the
West during this period than she did from the East.
In October, 1957, Syria had received credit from the Soviets
amounting to $168 million to finance nineteen development projects.
The loans were to be drawn over a period of seven years, repayable at
2.5 per cent interest per year, calculated on each part of the credit
from the date it was drawn. Payment for each portion of credit drawn
would begin only after the project was in operation, and was to be
payable in twelve annual installments.
g
Kermit Roosevelt, Arabs, Oil and History (New York, 1949),
p. 231.
9
Robert Loring Allen, Middle Eastern Economic Relations with the
Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Mainland China (Charlottesville, Va.,
1958), p. 14.
47
A similar arrangement was signed between Egypt and the Soviets in
January, 1958, for $175 million to be used in forty development projects
and possible sixty-five develop projects. Repayment was modeled closely
to the Syrian form. This credit was a portion of Egypt's five-year
industrialization program scheduled to cost $750 million.
The building of the High Dam at Aswan was outside the massive
industrialization program. Until 1956, Nasser, the United States and
Britain hoped the Aswan would be financed with Western funds. However,
as noted in Chapter III, the relationship between Nasser and the Soviet
Union, coupled with Secretary of State Dulles' abrupt withdrawal of
American aid to finance the dam, proved this idea futile.
In December, 1958, Egypt accepted a Soviet loan of $100 million
to finance the Aswan, with the stipulation that Soviet technicians and
machinery be used in the construction. At that time the United Arab
Republic announced its freedom from commitments for the second and most
expensive stage of the dam, implying that Western governments would be
welcomed to bid on the project.
To service projects implemented under the Soviet loans the United
Arab Republic contained 655 Communist technicians in its Egyptian
region, and 735 in the Syrian region. *■
In January, 1960, Egypt accepted a Soviet offer to build the
second stage of the Aswan under the same conditions of the first
stage--namely, using Soviet men and machinery. The amount of credit
advanced was estimated at $280 million, with completion scheduled
three years earlier than the target date, and at a reduced cost of
$968 million.
nEllis, op. cit.. pp. 160-64.
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Despite the seemingly favorable relationship between the United
Arab Republic and the Soviets, the relationship has not been completely
harmonious. The United Arab Republic has been displeased with several
tactics used by the Soviets. The Soviets have used the trading tactic
of re-selling cotton purchased from the United Arab Republic at a dis
count on the Western European market. Moreover, the Soviets stay out of
the United Arab Republic cotton buying market until buyers from the
West have made their entry. Then the Soviets enter the market, buy
heavily and thus force the price far beyond what the Westerners wish to
pay. This keeps the purchases of the West low and insures the United
Arab Republic's continued dependence upon the Soviets. Further, the
Soviets often deliver goods long after the United Arab Republic has paid
for them. This places the United Arab Republic in the position of a
creditor of the Soviets, being left, in the meantime, without the pro
mised goods or the cash to put to work in other areas. The United Arab
Republic and the Soviets have a bilateral trade agreement, hence each
deal is withdrawn from the open market, enabling the Soviets to place
higher prices on their goods and often making substitutions in deli
veries. While the trading practices with the Soviets are helpful to
the United Arab Republic, for they provide goods and services which
would otherwise have to be paid for in cash, and the United Arab Republic
is able to maintain trade surpluses with the Soviets, the conditions of
this trade make the United Arab Republic uneasy. However, as long as
the United Arab Republic is unable to sell her cotton to the free world,
she is virtually helpless to this arrangement.Xi
12Ibid., pp. 165-67.
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Trend of United States-United Arab Republic Relations.—Starting
early in 1958, relations between the United Arab Republic and the
United States began to improve. Primarily responsible for the improve
ments, perhaps, was Ambassador Raymond Hare, who succeeded Mr. Henry A.
Byroade. Ambassador Byroade, who had been Assistant Secretary of
State for Near East and African Affairs, had established an excellent
informal relationship with Nasser. Mr. Byroade was the only American
Ambassador who has dealt with Nasser on a first-name basis. Ambassador
Byroade had established a relationship so that Ambassador Hare was
faced with conditions to quicken the recent American policy of
13
"attentive inactivity." The road back towards good relations had to
be traveled quietly, with little publicity, and with no fixed schedule
of achievement in mind. An attempt to initiate a fixed policy would
only heighten Egyptian suspicious that the United States was still
only interested in "imperialism."
The American Ambassador waited until Nasser's disenchantment with
the Communists made him receptive to some gestures by the United
States.^ It was Mr. Hare's task to persuade the State Department
that the gestures would not be used by Nasser to play one side against
the other, as Washington felt its aid had been used since the Soviet
arms deal of 1955.
In the early stages of the "new relationship" neither side
fully trusted the other. Both sides knew that they must not subject
13Ibid., pp. 37-39.
New York Times, October 10, p. 1, and December 18, 1957,
P. 9.
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themselves to undue publicity, for it might destroy what progress
had been made. Nasser had to avoid the charge that he was falling
into the grasp of American imperialists in his effort to escape the
Communists.
In August the first provisional step was taken when the United
States released $400 thousand worth of road-building and other equip
ment, originally meant for Egypt but had been held in the United
States since November, 1956. In September the United States allowed
CARE to resume its school lunch feeding program for more than a
million Egyptian children. Although the handling of the food was done
by CARE, the food supplies themselves were supplied by the United
States government. Also in September Washington released Egypt's
frozen sterling balances in the United States amounting to about
$21 million.
On December 22, 1958, the Suez Canal Authority leased the giant
United States Army dredge "Essayon," to be used to deepen the Bitter
Lakes in the Suez Canal and to improve the harbor of Port Said. The
dredge was used twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week for six
months, and was leased to Egypt for $1,600 per day less than an
American business would have had to pay.
Also in December, 1958, the United States agreed to sell Egypt
$25 million worth of wheat for Egyptian pounds. This sale was made
under the Agricultural Trade and Development Act of 1954 (Public Law
480).15 This was the first of several agreements under which this
15public Law 480, enacted by Congress in July, 1954, has three
titles or sections. The most widely used section is Title I, whereby
surplus goods are sold to a country in return for its local currency.
The money received is then put to work within the country concerned.
51
type of aid to Egypt increased to almost $100 million by the end of
1959.
Under the stipulations of Public Law 480 some of the local
currency has been lent back to the United Arab Republic government
for development projects. Other funds are used to pay American
Embassy and counsular expense within the United Arab Republic. Some
of the funds from the sale of wheat was used to pay for an exchange
of students and teachers when the Fulbright educational exchange pro
gram was renewed by Washington and Cairo on September 28, 1959. It
was during this time that Egypt withdrew many of its students from
Communist-bloc schools and sent them to the West.
In March, 1959, the United States released almost $8 million in
old economic assistance funds to Egypt, frozen since the Suez crisis.
United States Point Four aid to Egypt was resumed for highway develop
ment and the training of civil aviation specialists. In April, 1959,
American specialists returned to Egypt to aid in the draining of
swamplands under the direction of the Egyptian-American Rural
Improvement Service. Under this program two areas of land have been
drained and prepared to grow grain crops.
Other steps include the loan of $5 million by the Export-Import
Bank to an Egyptian chemical factory; the completion of a treaty
avoiding double taxation for nationals of the two countries; and the
hiring of American firms to aid in Suez Canal improvements, capped by
a World Bank loan in December, 1959, of $56 million to widen and
deepen the Suez Canal. The Egyptians have also received the assistance
16Ellis, op. cit., pp. 55-57.
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of an American expert form the United States Geologic Survey, which
has resulted in an increased water supply for the Libyan Desert area
west of the Nile.
It was the Iraqi revolution of July 14, 1958, which caused Nasser
to ask the United States for aid to Syria. The renewal of American aid
had been confined to Egypt, the southern region of the United Arab
Republic, and the revolution implied a threat to President Nasser's
hold over Syria. Before this time Syria had never accepted United
States aid. Syria had rejected Point Four, and was regarded as the
most anti-Western of all the major Arab lands. However, on November
12, 1959, the United States announced that the Development Loan Fund
would lend $700 thousand to a private Syrian firm to build a woolen
firm outside Damascus. A few days later the United States made public
the sale of over $9 million worth of wheat and barley to Syria under
a Public Law 480 agreement. These goods were to be paid for in Syrian
pounds, whereby 50 per cent of the funds were used for aid for Syrian
development projects; 25 per cent was lent to Syrian import-export firms
to help them buy Western rather than Communist goods; and the remaining
25 per cent was used to meet United States expenses, including the cost
of running the two American consulates general in Damascus and Aleppo.
Throughout the relationship between the United States and Syria,
caution was used. New projects were carefully screened from the
public until they could be signed and put into operation. Syria was
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at this time groping toward better relations with the United States
just as Egypt was in 1958.17
17Ibid., pp. 58-61. Technical aid was extended to Syria in 1960,
and after Syria withdrew from the United Arab Republic she turned to the
West for aid. New York Times. August 26, 1959, p. 16.
CHAPTER V
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION
The United States, in order to protect its security and world
wide interests, has had to lift many burdens from the shoulders of
those nations that could no longer carry them. Hence, the United
States has been faced with the problem of moving into many areas of
the world, attempting to develop policies to enable these nations from
being engulfed by the tides of Communism. The realization of this
role in the Middle East came late and amid confusion as to just what
course to pursue. It came at a time when there existed uncertainty
in Americans as to where their interests lay; in the absence of a
workable understanding with England and France; and at a time when the
nations of the Middle East were submerged in unresolved conflict, void
of mature or responsible leadership, and vulnerable to Soviet penetra
tion. The Soviet Union already had a firm footing in the Middle East
and was looked to as a great and good friend.
The United States had great difficulty in the Middle East in
its role as a partner or organizer of the strength of the free world.
This was due, primarily, to the fact that the Middle East was a region
with no united will against the Soviets and a region of many con
flicting aims and interests. The United States was faced with a dual
dilemma. First, the United States had to act amid an everchanging
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situation, often involving strong political pressures at home and many
and varied criticisms from abroad. Second, because of its powerful po
sition in the world, other countries looked to the United States for sup
port of particular interests and were critical when this support was
absent or inadequate.
Although the United States has sought to formulate long-range
policies, it has found itself able to do little more than meet crises
as they arose. The diplomatic efforts of the United States have had to
take two roads simultaneously. First, the road of mediation and com
promise; to settle conflicts standing in the way of general cooperation
evident in the disputes over the Suez Canal, inter-Arab rivalries, and
the never-ending conflicts between the Arabs and Israel. Second, the
road of moving ahead to prevent further Communist penetration evident
in the courting of Egypt, the initiative for northern tier alignments,
and the Eisenhower Doctrine. Neither road was an easy one; both were
strewn with obstacles. The mediation did not always prove effective,
for many were beyond America's capacity to solve. Meanwhile, attempts
to build barriers, although they were not without merit, often only
heightened the conflicts and suffered from defects of unilateral or
partial measures.
Many American observers in the Middle East, diplomatic and pri
vate, are convinced that United States interest in the Middle East can
not be served without some modest cooperation with President Nasser,
the acknowledged leader of Arab nationalism. The United States must re
cognize that Nasser is the single most powerful man in the Arab world,
and it appears impossible to work harmoniously with the Arabs without
his cooperation.
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American policy in the Middle East has not been all of a piece,
but made up of several different strands, some coming close to in
compatibility with the others. One strand was United States support
of King Hussein of Jordan. Another was cooperation with the royal
house of Saudi Arabia. Neither monarchy was liked by Nasser, or by
Israel. However, both Israel and Nasser accepted American support of
the kings because neither wished to risk the consequences of trying to
change the present condition of affairs in Jordan or Saudi Arabia.
Israel and the United Arab Republic did not complain about American
relations with the other Arab states, or about Washington's formal
alliances with Turkey and Iran. Although Turkey and Iran are friendly
with Israel, they are non-Arab countries and do not threaten President
Nasser's concept of "positive neutrality" for the Arabs.
What makes America's Middle Eastern policy hazardous is the
attempt to be friendly with both Israel and the United Arab Republic.
Such friendship seems feasible as long as neither side makes a military
move toward the other, and as long as the Jewish influence in America
does not produce Congressional action damaging to the United Arab
Republic.
Although there is little question of our severing ties with
Israel,there should also be little question about cutting our still
fragile ties with the United Arab Republic, if the interests of the
United States are to be served. The primary objections to Mr. Nasser
are that he is anti-Western and an enemy to Israel. The question is
whether the United States must sacrifice the interests of other nations
(our allies, Britain, Israel and Jordan) to get along with the United
Arab Republic.
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The question of American relations with Nasser acquired
pertinence in December, 1958, when he began his anti-Communist
campaign. The leaders of Jordan and Israel continued to assert that
the leopard had not changed his spots and that Nasser's anti-communism
was only a temporary expedient. Others asserted, however, that Nasser's
rift with the Communist gives the West an excellent opportunity to
place itself in the forefront of Arab thought, hence increasing the
chances that communism will be defeated in the Middle East.
There is ample evidence that Nasser welcomes economic and
technical aid from the United States, unconnected with any political
conditions, to aid him in meeting Egypt's staggering economic problems.
The economic and technical aid would also help to foster the impression
that President Nasser and the United States, each without sacrificing
principle, have found it possible to get along together. Such an im
pression would help to mitigate the suspicion that the United States
opposes Arab nationalism and would bolster Nasser's prestige among
many anti-Communist Arabs in other countries.
Some members of the State Department are asking if Nasser
learned his lesson. If he has learned his lesson, then perhaps we can
deal with him. This would seem to mean that if Nasser is ready to
abandon his attacks on the West and his doctrine of "positive
neutrality," then we will be able to deal with him. However, there
is little evidence that Nasser is willing to abandon his doctrine of
"positive neutrality." For President Nasser, nonalignment of the United
Arab Republic is the only escape from domination by one power or the
other.
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Further, it appears that it would be harmful to the United
States if Nasser deserted his nonalignment policy and came into the
Western fold. An abandonment of "positive neutrality" would give
Nasser's enemies positive grounds for charging that he has deserted the
movement for Arab independence.
Nasser has become convinced that the Soviet Union also aims at
controlling Arab affairs. Hence he is no more likely to trust Russia
than the West. Thus, in this sense Nasser's "positive neutrality"
works both ways. This does not mean that Nasser desires to discontinue
Soviet aid, which the United Arab Republic army and economy are highly
dependent upon. For Nasser, aid from the East is no more harmful than
aid from the West, as long as neither has political conditions attached.
Further, the Communist East offers the only sizeable market presently
open to Egyptian cotton.
The question of whether American aid to the United Arab Republic
has or will help defeat communism in the Middle East is still un
answered. From the American standpoint it appears that Western aid to
Nasser will serve to deter Communism. President Nasser presently
serves as the rallying point for the anti-Communist Arabs. President
Nasser's image in the Arab world has been tarnished somewhat by the
failure of the Mosul revolt in Iraq, and by his failure to subvert
the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the Sudan, Tunisia and Lebanon.
However, Nasser's ability to secure Soviet aid to build the Aswan Dam,
his success in attracting American aid, and his refusal to allow
Israeli cargoes through the Suez Canal has added a coat of gloss to
his tarnished image.
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United Arab Republic-United States cooperation indicates to many
Arabs that the United States has accepted Nasser on his own terms as
leader of the Arab nationalist movement. Such a policy by the United
States involves a risk to Israel, Britain and pro-Western Arab kings.
However, there is no clear indication that the risks to these powers
would be any less if the United States kept Nasser at a greater dis
tance. Further, it seems evident that a decline in Nasser's influence
in the Arab world would only serve to advance the Communist influence
in the Middle East. President Nasser remains the most influential and
populat leader in the Middle East. To oppose or be passive toward him
would only obstruct United States endeavors in the Middle East. It
would seem completely illogical to attempt to seek area-wide objectives
while, at the same time, alienating the majority of the people in
the area.
Future Arab policy depends upon what ingredients American citizens
decides should go into our Middle Eastern policy. We all realize that
the prerequisite of this policy is to start with the undefinable
national interest. When this is done, then the necessity is evident
for several additional steps including United States alliances with
Turkey and Iran, an American guarantee of the integrity of Israel, a
United States guarantee of Arab frontiers, and cooperative arrangements
with individual Arab states.
Of all the strands of policy, only the United States-United
Arab Republic relations are in question, as evidenced in Congressional
attempts to restrict Americans aid to the United Arab Republic. This
means taking sides in the Arab-Israeli dispute. However, favoritism
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to either side is not suited for gaining the trust of the Arabs,
among whom the United States has great interests. To serve those
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